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Abstract 
Commercialization (private sector or Non-SBIR federal funding) of federally sponsored 
innovations is a key congressionally mandated goal of the Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. While much attention has 
focused on quantifying and assessing the commercial outputs of the SBIR program, limited 
research exists on the impact that business advisory support initiatives have on project 
commercialization. These programs, such as the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program (TAP), 
seek to augment the business capacity of SBIR/STTR award recipients by providing information 
and resources focused on facilitating the commercialization process. I hypothesize that these 
programs increase the probability of commercialization success for participating SBIR Phase II 
projects. To test this hypothesis, I employed a logistic regression model exploring 
commercialization outcomes from participants and non-participants from the Navy's Transition 
Assistance Program (TAP). A dataset comprised of 993 Navy Phase II projects awarded between 
2005 and 2008 was used to populate the model. The self-reported commercialization outcomes 
contained in the dataset include 537 Navy TAP projects, and a comparison group of 456 Navy 
Phase II projects who opted not to participate in the program during the years covered. The 
resulting analysis found that the odds of success given that a project participated in the Navy TAP 
ranged from 1.5 to 6.2 times the odds of success for a non-participating project, depending upon 
firm characteristics. It was also found that for every dollar invested in the Navy TAP, $38 dollars 
in commercialization outcomes were generated. This research demonstrates that external business 
support can be an effective policy option for impacting the probability and magnitude of SBIR 
commercialization success.  
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1. Introduction 
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program was established in 1982 to 
strengthen the role innovative small businesses play in conducting federally funded research. In 
addition to fostering innovation, the SBIR program sought to make use of, “small business to meet 
Federal research and development needs” (Small Business Development Act, 1982). In 1992, its 
sister program, the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program was established, and 
required small businesses to partner with research institutions in an effort to bridge the gap between 
basic research and commercialization (Small Business Research and Development Enhancement 
Act, 1992). SBIR and STTR are three phased programs which require federal agencies to set-aside 
a portion of their extramural research and develop budgets for competitively awarded grants or 
contracts to small businesses. Federal agencies with extramural research and development budgets 
greater than $100 million, are required to set-aside no less than 2.8 percent of those funds for the 
SBIR program, and agencies with extramural research and development budgets greater than $1 
billion are required to set-aside no less than .4 percent of those funds for the STTR program. 1 
Eleven federal agencies are required to participate in the SBIR program because they meet 
or exceed the extramural research and development budgetary threshold. Five of these agencies 
also meet the requirements for the STTR program (Department of Defense, Department of Energy, 
Department of Health and Human Services, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and 
the National Science Foundation). For FY2011 the cumulative extramural research and 
development budget across the eleven participating agencies was approximately $84.6 billion, and 
funds obligated from the SBIR/STTR programs were close to $2.5 billion (SBA Annual Report, 
2011). SBIR/STTR funds are provided to awardees during Phase I (feasibility study) and Phase II 
(research and development) of the program; however, SBIR funds are not allowed during Phase 
III, the commercialization phase. Although the responsibility of commercializing the federally 
sponsored research remains with the small business, in response to increasing congressional 
interest on commercial outputs of the program, federal agencies have sought to impact 
                                                 
1
 Prior to the 2011 reauthorization of the program, the set-a-side was 2.5 percent for SBIR, and .3 percent for 
STTR. The reauthorization increases the SBIR set-a-side to 3.2 percent by FY 2017, and the STTR set-a-side to .45 
by FY2016.  
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commercialization by developing and administering commercialization/transition assistance 
programs (henceforth referred to as commercialization assistance programs).   
The birth of the SBIR concept traces back to the Research Applied to National Needs 
(RANN) program established in the 1970s at the National Science Foundation (NSF). The program 
sought to engage the private sector and shift NSF towards more applied research in an effort to 
stimulate innovation and economic benefit from federal research and development funding (Green 
& Lepkowski, 2006). The RANN program sought to address current and emerging societal 
concerns by identifying technical problems and soliciting solutions from the private sector (e.g. 
academia and industry), fund studies to demonstrate the feasibility of their solutions, and then 
transfer the developed ideas to the commercial sector (Green & Lepkowski, 2006). A component 
of the RANN program called for NSF to set-aside ten percent of the budget for small businesses, 
which in 1982 only shared in 3 percent of federal research and development funding (Small 
Business Research and Development Enhancement Act, 1992). This structure and small business 
set-aside lead to the creation in 1976, by Roland Tibbetts, administrative officer of RANN, of the 
SBIR program. In establishing the program Mr. Tibbetts sought to leverage the cutting edge 
capacity of small firms by testing as many high risk technical ideas as possible (SBIR/STTR 
Reauthorization Act Report, 2009). While the RANN program ended in the late 1980s, the SBIR 
program survived and became law with the passing of the Small Business Innovation Development 
Act of 1982. In establishing the program, Congress sought to leverage small innovative firms to 
stimulate technological innovations that met both agency and national economic needs (Small 
Business Development Act, 1982).  
The national policy goal of leveraging federal research and development to champion 
economic growth was part of a broader movement taking place during the 1980s. Other pivotal 
pieces of legislation at the beginning of the decade included the Technology Innovation Act of 
1980 (Stevenson-Wydler Act, 1980) and the Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act (Bayh-
Dole Act, 1980). These acts signaled a national policy shift towards the transfer of federal research 
and development to the private sector to stimulate economic growth (Research and Development: 
National Trends and International Comparisons, 2014). The Stevenson-Wydler Act addressed the 
transfer of technology from federal research labs to industry, while, the Bayh-Dole act provided 
for patent ownership to remain with recipients of federal research and development programs as 
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an incentive to encourage commercialization of the technology (Schacht, 2000). The focus on 
economic outcomes of federal research and development has continued to be stressed in 
subsequent reauthorizations and amendments of these acts, including the SBIR program. 
Congress instructed federal agencies to factor a company’s commercial potential when 
making awards as a component of the program’s 1992 reauthorization (Small Business Research 
and Development Enhancement Act, 1992). This marked the first time commercial potential 
became a factor in award decisions. Congress sought to dissuade agencies form making awards to 
previous SBIR award winners who had failed to demonstrate successful commercialization of 
previously funded projects, while encouraging agencies to make more awards to firms with a 
commercialization track record--demonstrated through prior success commercializing SBIR 
research (LaFalce, 1992). When the program was reauthorized in 2000, Congress required small 
businesses to submit a commercialization plan as a part of their Phase II award application (Small 
Business Reauthorization Act, 2000). This provision, supported by the National Venture Capital 
Association and negotiated by the House Science Committee, sought to ensure that award winners 
were planning for commercialization by ensuring they had a strategy in place to penetrate federal 
or commercial markets (Udall, 1999). Taken together the 1992 and 2000 reauthorizations 
emphasized commercialization as an integral component of the program. As Congress has stressed 
the importance of economic outputs from federally sponsored research stemming from the 
SBIR/STTR program, federal agencies have sought resources and mechanisms to support small 
businesses through the commercialization process. 
A survey of SBIR awardees found that a lack of market knowledge and marketing skills 
was the most frequently cited obstacle to commercialization, and that many SBIR firms needed 
business assistance to commercialize their technology (Cooper, 2003). According to the National 
Research Council (2008), “Agencies have begun to see that the technically sophisticated winners 
of Phase II awards are in many cases inexperienced business people with only a limited 
understanding of how to transition their work into the marketplace” (p. 213). Commercialization 
assistance programs are viewed by some program managers and outside observers as a mechanism 
to overcome this knowledge gap.  
The Department of Energy first developed a commercialization assistance program in 1989 
to help companies market their SBIR funded projects (General Accounting Office, 1995). Since 
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then, additional federal agencies have implemented individualized versions of commercialization 
assistance programs.2 While each agency’s SBIR commercialization assistance program is unique 
to their mission, they tend to share common traits: they are voluntary for award recipients, 
generally support business strategy development, seek to surface additional funding opportunities, 
and provide access to market information (National Research Council, 2008). 
Federal agencies have had the legal authority to implement commercialization assistance 
programs since 1992. The Small Business Development Enhancement Act (1992) allowed federal 
agencies to contract with a vendor to provide commercialization support to Phase I recipients using 
resources from the agency SBIR set-aside. However, in the case of Phase II, the agency could not 
provide services using set-aside funds, but instead, could permit the individual awardees to procure 
services independently using a portion of their Phase II award funds. According to a General 
Accounting Office report (1995), the authority to authorize small businesses to seek independent 
support was criticized by SBIR program managers. Among their criticisms was the belief that 
significant administrative burdens would arise from case-by-case reviews of company requests for 
support (General Accounting Office, 1995). The Department of Energy, and subsequently the 
Navy, worked around these restrictions by investing non set-aside funds to establish 
commercialization assistance programs for Phase II awards.  
In a 2007 hearing before the House Science and Technology Subcommittee on Technology 
and Innovation, SBIR program managers from the five largest participating agencies were asked 
to provide testimony regarding “what elements were needed to address financing and 
commercialization in the SBIR program” (Small Business Innovation Research Reauthorization 
on the 25th Program Anniversary, 2007). In a statement provided on behalf of the Department of 
Defense, Linda Oliver, acting director of small business programs, requested both an increase in 
the level of funding available for commercialization assistance and the authority, “to provide the 
assistance directly or through the Phase II contract” (Small Business Innovation Research 
Reauthorization on the 25th Program Anniversary, 2007). Oliver's testimony was the most specific 
in terms of a commercialization assistance policy recommendation. While the other agencies were 
                                                 
2
 For example, the Navy Transition Assistance Program was created in 2000, and the National Institutes of 
Health Commercialization Assistance Program was created in 2004. 
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not specific in their recommendations they echoed the belief that assistance to awardees was 
important (Small Business Innovation Research Reauthorization on the 25th Program 
Anniversary, 2007).  
While the research literature on the SBIR program has focused extensively on the 
commercial outputs of SBIR funded technologies (General Accounting Office, 1992; National 
Research Council, 2008; Lerner, 1999), little attention has focused on the complementary activities 
undertaken by agencies to facilitate commercialization of federally funded research. Despite the 
limited qualitative or quantitative evidence of the programs' effectiveness, new resources and 
authority for commercialization assistance programs were provided within the SBIR/STTR 
Reauthorization Act of 2011. The SBIR program was amended to allow federal agencies to provide 
commercialization assistance directly to an award recipient in an amount not to exceed $10,000 
per awardee (SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act, 2011). The legislation also provided further 
flexibility and resources by allowing federal agencies to use up to 3 percent of their SBIR set-aside 
for administrative funding, including the implementation of commercialization initiatives 
(SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act, 2011). As a result of these legislative changes, all participating 
agencies can implement commercialization assistance programs and finance them using funding 
from the SBIR set-aside.  
Prior to this reauthorization, the implementation of commercialization assistance programs 
for Phase II award recipients were limited to agencies that had the will and resources to use 
administrative funding--non SBIR set-aside funds--to execute the programs. Given the continued 
emphasis on commercialization and, recently legislated penalties for small businesses that fail to 
meet minimum commercialization requirements (SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act, 2011), this 
calculus may be changing. The 2011 Reauthorization established minimum benchmarks for 
multiple-award winners as it relates to transitioning from Phase I to Phase II, as well as, from 
Phase II to Phase III (commercialization). Firms that have received more than 20 awards during 
the previous five fiscal years must have a Phase I to Phase II transition ratio of at least .25. The 
commercialization benchmark (transition from Phase II to Phase III) applies to Phase I firms that 
have won at least 16 Phase II awards during the past 10 years. These firms must have obtained an 
average of $100,000 from sales/investments per Phase II, or their SBIR projects must have resulted 
in a number of patents equal to at least 15 percent of the number of Phase II awards they won 
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during the 10 year period. Failure to meet these standards makes the firm ineligible for new Phase 
I awards for a period of one year ("Performance Benchmarks", 2013). 
The impetus for adding these performance standards was motivated by a need to “refocus” 
the emphasis of the programs on Phase III commercialization. In explaining the need for the award 
limits, the House Small Business Committee felt that federal agencies found it easier to make 
Phase I and Phase II awards to a small set of firms rather than identifying a broader community of 
firms interested in commercializing federally funded research (Creating Jobs through Small 
Business Innovation Act Report, 2011). The report further reiterates that the primary, if not sole, 
purpose behind the SBIR and STTR programs is commercialization of federally funded research 
(Creating Jobs through Small Business Innovation Act Report, 2011). Despite this emphasis,   
using small businesses to meet Federal research and development needs remains as one of the 
legislated goals. So while commercialization is important, it is not the sole goal. However, given 
this renewed focus on commercialization, based upon hearings and my conversations with program 
managers, I anticipate more agencies will make use of the allowable amounts from the SBIR set-
aside to establish commercialization assistance programs (Small Business Innovation Research 
Reauthorization on the 25th Program Anniversary, 2007).  
This project is timely given the penalties for small firms who fail to meet the minimum 
commercialization benchmarks, congressional focus on commercialization, and the new resources 
and authority provided to federal agencies to support the commercialization process. Prior to this 
new authority the SBIR set-aside funding was restricted to Phase I and Phase II awards for small 
businesses. This new authority means that agencies can invest up to $5,000 to support Phase I 
projects, and up to $10,000 to support Phase II projects, approximately 3% and 1% of the 
recommended Phase I and Phase II award levels, respectively. Now that federal agencies can 
facilitate commercialization through commercialization assistance programs, using funding from 
the set-aside, they must weigh their interest in commercialization outcomes against those of 
seeding innovations through additional SBIR Phase I and Phase II awards. If the full amounts 
available for commercialization was applied to all award recipients, the total investment would 
have been slightly more than $41 million for FY11, i.e. 1.6 percent of the FY11 SBIR and STTR 
budget.  
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The literature on the SBIR program thus far has treated commercialization outcomes as 
endogenous to the project. This thesis may indicate that commercialization outcomes are not solely 
endogenous to the firm, by demonstrating exogenous support (commercialization assistance 
programs) potentially enhances the probability of commercialization. Quantifying this effect will 
allow federal agencies to seed innovation by making awards to the most technically promising 
technologies, and augmenting their commercialization capacity through external 
commercialization assistance. This project quantifies the probability of commercialization given 
that a project participated in the Navy’s commercialization assistance program. The findings will 
support policy makers by clarifying the tradeoffs between supporting commercialization assistance 
versus seeding new awards. 
1.1. Navy Transition Assistance Program 
The Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP) was established in 2000 by John Williams, 
the Navy SBIR Program Manager, and is implemented by a support contractor, Dawnbreaker, Inc.3 
The Navy invests approximately $15,000 per small business participant, utilizing the department's 
administrative budget (National Research Council, 2007), to provide participants with access to 
expert business consulting, market research, Department of Defense transition planning, and 
marketing support during the 11-month Transition Assistance Program (Sullivan, 2013).   The 
objective of the TAP is to provide information and points of contacts that help identify transition 
(commercialization) paths, prepare marketing materials that convey the business opportunity, and 
to provide access to technology evaluators and decision makers to surface funding opportunities 
(Servo, 2013). The Navy TAP culminates in a partner/investor event called the Navy Opportunity 
Forum. Small firm participation in the Navy Opportunity Forum is restricted to Phase II award 
winners that have completed the requirements of that year’s Navy Transition Assistance Program. 
The 2013 Navy Opportunity Forum was attended by more than 1,200 representatives from federal 
acquisition programs, technology evaluators, decision makers from large DoD prime contractors, 
large technology firms, and private sector investors. 4  
                                                 
3
 I work for the support contractor, Dawnbreaker, Inc.  
4
 http://www.navyopportunityforum.com/ 
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The Navy requires all Phase II award recipients to attend a one-day Transition Assistance 
Program (TAP) meeting held annually during the month of July. During this kickoff event 
participants are exposed to information on the Navy SBIR program, successful commercialization 
strategies, intellectual property protection techniques, and information on the Transition 
Assistance Program. Following the event, participants have a two week period to opt into the TAP 
program. 5 Those opting into the program receive project level support, with the costs covered by 
the Navy. Participating firms are expected to invest the necessary time to complete program 
deliverables and attend the Navy Opportunity Forum (Servo, 2013). This time expenditure is not 
billable to their Navy SBIR and STTR contracts, which may serve as a deterrent for some, while 
ensuring participants have “skin in the game.”  
Participant commitment is important because the Navy TAP is a collaborative partnership 
between the service contractor and the firm. TAP participants are provided a team composed of a 
business consultant, market research specialist, and graphic designer. The business consultant uses 
an iterative deliverable based approach while working with the participant. Their collaborative 
back and forth effort is focused on enhancing marketing capacity and collateral. The business 
consultant also provides transition and commercialization mentoring. They attempt to augment the 
participant’s knowledge by surfacing information to clarify market opportunities and facilitate 
transition and commercialization planning. The Dawnbreaker team takes the lead throughout this 
process, but the TAP participant is required to partake in the development of commercialization 
planning documents, review and participate in market research debriefs, and participate in at least 
10 training webinars (topics range from: protection of intellectual property, working with prime 
contractors, to developing a compelling Phase III transition Plan). If TAP participants fall too far 
behind they are politely asked to withdraw from the program (Servo, 2013).  
The TAP was explained by a program participant in testimony before the House Committee 
on Science, Space, and Technology as so: 
Galois has benefited from participation in several SBIR support resources, and especially 
from those that focus on transition and commercialization. Prime among these is the 
Navy’s Transition Assistance Program, or TAP, which gave Galois substantial new and 
useful understanding and capability in commercialization. The program is voluntary for 
                                                 
5
 http://www.dawnbreaker.com/programs/navy-tap.php 
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Navy Phase-II winners, and requires a commitment in time and money from the company 
to participate. Over a year’s time and under advisor guidance, Galois learned or improved 
capabilities in how to evaluate a particular market, assess a venture partner, write a business 
plan, produce marketing collateral that is informative to defense industry primes, and 
present at an industry-focused conference. Each of these skills has been reused and 
deepened since that experience. Of particular note, the Dawnbreaker advisor provided 
baseline criteria for examining venture opportunities, which Galois applied immediately to 
the KSys opportunity. This information facilitated the development of that 
commercialization effort (McKinney, 2011, p. 11). 
Participants who have completed the Transition Assistance Program have reported 
commercialization success. There were 693 projects presenting at a Navy Opportunity Forum 
between 2002 and 2007, 61 percent of them reported non-SBIR funding within 18 months of 
program completion. Those projects cumulative reported approximately $1.15 billion in Phase III 
funding (Williams, 2010). The commercialization funding reported includes both sales in the 
commercial market as well as non-SBIR federal funding for additional development or to procure 
products or services resulting from the SBIR project. This definition reflects the dual goals of the 
SBIR program to meet both agency needs and contribute to economic growth (Small Business 
Research and Development Enhancement Act, 1992).  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. SBIR and Commercialization Assistance as a Response to Market Failures 
Since markets only inefficiently allocate the pure public goods, like knowledge based 
innovations, government plays a role in the research and development market. Martin and Scott 
(2000) addressed this question while reviewing the economic literature of innovation based market 
failure. They found that the limited ability of innovative firms to capture the benefits of their 
research and development investments represented an innovation market failure resulting in 
suboptimal investment in innovation from a public perspective. It was once held that larger firms 
had a competitive advantage in the innovation market which allowed them to capture the benefits 
of their research and development, however, they found that this innovation market failure 
occurred irrespective of firm size.  
Link (1999) offers additional support for the role information plays in a firm’s decision to 
undertake research and development projects. While research and development market failures are 
often discussed in terms of appropriating returns, Link (1999) recognizes and discusses the inherit 
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risks in advanced research and development. He notes that private firms face both technical and 
market risks when determining their research and development investments. If firms view the 
probability of reaping a commercial reward for a given investment as too risky, given the level of 
knowledge needed to both develop the innovation and to market it, they will tend to under-invest 
in research and development (Link, 1999, p. 193; Link and Scott, 2001, p. 764).  
Link and Scott (2001) continue to stress the importance of market based risks in research 
and development decisions. They identify technical and market based uncertainties when 
considering these investments. Firms are concerned if their technology will meet the technical 
specifications necessary to justify their investment, and even if they are confident that they can 
meet those specifications, uncertainty remains over market acceptance. These risks factor into the 
returns a private firm would expect from a given investment in R&D. Because of the technical and 
market uncertainties, firms tend not to invest in projects with potentially high societal returns, but 
lower prospects of private returns. Small firms receiving SBIR awards are faced with overcoming 
both the technical and market based uncertainties of the federally sponsored research.  
Generating social benefits from federal research and development investments in the 
SBIR/STTR program is among the congressional goals. The SBIR/STTR program seeks to engage 
small businesses to meet federal research and development needs as well as generate commercial 
outcomes from those investments. While small firms in the SBIR program often possess the 
technical skillset to meet the innovative challenges associated with the development of advanced 
technologies, their ability to translate those technical developments into commercially viable, or 
acquisition ready (in the case of the Department of Defense), products and services are often 
lacking (National Research Council, 2008, p. 223). Federal program managers implementing 
external advisory services are seeking to overcome these deficiencies, and maximize the positive 
externalities and spillover effects of increased performance resulting from market based 
commercialization of the federally sponsored technology. Their interest in influencing the firm 
performance through external advisory support is closely linked to the market failure based 
rationale for public and private partnerships.  
Storey (2003) provides a discussion on why policies exist to influence small and medium 
size firm performance through outside business advisory support services. He frames the 
discussion in terms of two market failures. The first market failure he discussed focused on 
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imperfect information while the second examined positive externalities. As a response to imperfect 
information, municipalities view small firms as ill-informed on the private benefits of external 
business advisory services which results in the firm purchasing a "sub-optimal quantity of advice" 
(p. 478), resulting in less than ideal performance. By offering commercialization assistance 
programs, federal agencies are bringing the private advisory services to the small business, seeking 
to overcome their underinvestment in support.  
The second market failure perspective views the presence of socially beneficial outcomes 
of higher performance which may result from investments in advisory services. These social 
benefits will not occur without a subsidized approach because small firms will, "under-estimate 
the private benefits of obtaining external advice/consultancy" (Storey, 2003, p. 482). While small 
firms in the SBIR program often possess the technical skillset to meet the innovative challenges 
associated with the development of advanced technologies, their ability to translate those technical 
developments into commercially viable, or acquisition ready (in the case of the Department of 
Defense), products and services often lacks (National Research Council, 2008, p. 223). The 
SBIR/STTR program both seeks to diversify the federal research and development marketplace 
while also generating societal benefits, including economic growth. I believe these dual goals 
contributes to participating firm’s under-estimating the benefits of securing private sector advisory 
support.  
The SBIR/STTR topic generation process signals an innovation gap to the research and 
development marketplace. While successful winners of SBIR/STTR Phase I and Phase II awards 
demonstrate the technical capacity to overcome this challenge, they may be under the false 
impression that their technical development translates into commercial acceptance. This particular 
concern exists within the acquisition community, where the SBIR/STTR may also signal a 
potential customer. However, navigation of the complex federal acquisition marketplace requires 
business expertise that firms often do not possess (National Research Council, 2008, p. 224), but 
is necessary to maximize societal benefits from taxpayer funded research and development.  
In summary, federal subsidizing of research and development seeks to address the 
underinvestment of private firms in a manner that maximizes societal benefits. In establishing the 
SBIR/STTR programs, Congress sought to harness the innovative capability of small businesses 
to both diversify the federal research and development service marketplace and generate societal 
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benefits. Maximizing the economic outcomes from the federal SBIR/STTR investments occur as 
firms commercialize (either in commercial markets or through the federal acquisition process) 
products and services which generate jobs, support advanced weapon systems, or drive down 
federal research and development costs through increased competition. While the small firms 
attracted to the SBIR/STTR programs may be technically advanced, they may lack the necessary 
business capacity to create these down-stream societal benefits. Storey (2003) found that small 
and medium firms tend to underinvest in the services which could augment their business capacity 
because they are unclear or underestimate the long-term benefits of those investments. To 
overcome this information failure, and to maximize the societal benefits from federal research and 
development funding, federal agencies have begun establishing external advisory support 
programs. 
2.2. SBIR Commercialization Assistance Needs 
The need for commercialization assistance was briefly discussed by Ronald Cooper, 
innovation policy specialist at the United States Small Business Administration, while describing 
the rationale for, and the performance of, the SBIR program. Within his description and 
explanation of the SBIR/STTR programs, Cooper (2003) described a prospective program to 
enhance SBIR commercialization. He envisioned a two part program focusing on both the financial 
gap between Phase II and early-stage capital, as well as business development support (p. 148). In 
describing the need for additional assistance, he felt the firms often had "top quality technological 
innovations, [but] often require business assistance to move them to a point where private markets-
-venture and angel capital--are willing to invest in them" (p. 148). This chasm between early stage 
ideas and sufficient capital to transform those concepts into commercial products is often referred 
to as the “valley of death” (Figure 1).   
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Figure 1 Diagram of the "Valley of Death" Source: (National Research Council, 2007, p. 8) 
The “valley of death” is not restricted to transforming technological information into 
commercially available products, but also appears when SBIR/STTR firms seek to commercialize 
their innovations within the federal marketplace. While the SBIR/STTR programs provide early 
stage seed funding to create new technical ideas and support the prototype development of those 
ideas, the funding is often inadequate to reduce the technical risks to acceptable levels for the 
federal acquisition community. This gap is depicted in Figure 2.6 The Navy TAP also supports 
firms in their efforts to overcome this valley of death by focusing on the business skills necessary 
to identify capital opportunities and convey their business case, in both the commercial and federal 
marketplaces.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Technology Readiness Levels originated with NASA and measure technical risk 
(http://esto.nasa.gov/files/TRL_definitions.pdf).  
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Figure 2 SBIR/STTR Valley of Death Diagram 
Projects developed under SBIR/STTR Phase I and Phase II funding typically reach a 
technology readiness level (TRL) of 4 or 5; however, the acquisition arm of the Department of 
Defense will often view that technology as too risky to invest programmatic funds. The DoD 
program offices are more willing to invest additional development or demonstration funding when 
a project reaches a TRL of 7 or 8 (National Research Council, 2007, p. 58). Given this gap, 
SBIR/STTR firms must traverse this valley by identifying resources to continue the development 
of their technology and reduce risk if they are going to successfully transition their technology. 
The Navy TAP supports them in these efforts by providing them marketing collateral, business 
mentoring, and a partner/investor event that connects them to funding opportunities.  
 This technology transition process has been defined as a two-way long-term 
communication process (National Research Council, 2004, p. 1). Michael McGrath, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation) identified five 
conditions that needed to be met for successful technology transition to the government: there must 
be a need, effective solution, business case, budgetary resources and acquisition mechanism 
(National Research Council, 2004, p. 27). Cooper (2003) and others (National Research Council, 
2008) have observed that SBIR/STTR award winners have the technical capacity to develop 
theoretically effective solutions, however, communicating their business case and strategically 
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planning around the budgetary and acquisition environments could be enhanced. A survey of SBIR 
award winners confirmed a need for this additional support. 
Under a grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Palmintera (2001)  developed and 
administered a survey to the population of SBIR Phase II award winners between FY94 and FY97 
to assess the business support needs of firms in the program. The survey was administered to 2,575 
firms across the eleven participating federal agencies and had a 24 percent response rate. The 
results of that research provide the logic underpinning many of the efforts federal agencies have 
undertaken to augment the business and marketing capacity of SBIR award recipients. Palmintera 
found that two thirds of respondents indicated that they needed some form of assistance. Although 
the census based approach does not result in a representative random sample, Palmintera did find 
that assistance varied by firm size, with smaller firms (1-5 employees) requiring more support for 
commercialization planning and marketing compared to firms with 50 or more employees. 
Palmintera also found that the need for marketing and commercialization related services, 
including support in partnering with other firms, were among the most frequently cited needs--
irrespective of firm size, technology area, or sponsoring agency.  
Transitioning innovative ideas into products and innovations is complex and challenging 
irrespective of the marketplace (federal acquisition or commercial). Firms face a challenge 
attracting the necessary capital to translate high risk early stage research into commercially viable 
products. This “valley of death” exists within the SBIR/STTR community, as the typical project 
is not developed to a sufficient level to signal a reduced risk to the marketplace (acquisition or 
commercial). The ability to market and convey the business case for these technologies plays a 
role in overcoming these challenges, but it has been found that many SBIR/STTR firms feel they 
need additional support in this area (Palmintera, 2001; National Research Council, 2008). 
Programs like the Navy TAP seek to provide this additional support.  
 
2.3. Business Advisory Support as a Commercialization Need 
Technical assistance to small firms is not unique to the SBIR/STTR programs. Examining 
the rationale behind other programs can augment the understanding of programs focused on the 
SBIR/STTR community. One example stems from the Small Business Development Center 
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program. Chrisman and McMullan (2004) examine a potential knowledge gap while assessing the 
long-term impact of the Small Business Development Center. According to them, "in many cases 
there is a gap between the knowledge possessed by entrepreneurs and the knowledge required for 
successful venturing" (p. 232). In many ways the underlying rationale for outsider assistance is 
consistent with the knowledge gap perspective expressed in support of developing 
commercialization assistance programs (National Research Council, 2008, p. 223). Chrisman and 
McMullan (2004) research stemmed from a longitudinal survey of Pennsylvania based SBDC 
clients surveyed in 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2001. Utilizing a comparison group drawn from a 2000 
study on general population survival rates for firms between 1992 and 1996, the authors measured 
the difference in firm survival rates and found that the SBDC supported ventures had a 
significantly higher survival rate.  
Cumming and Fisher (2012) sought to measure the impact of publicly funded advisory 
services on small and medium sized enterprises targeted towards growth and innovation. The 
authors utilized a population of 228 firms that contacted the Ontario based Investment Network, a 
business advisory service focused on small firm growth. They found that 101 firms received 
advising from the program, but by using pre-entry program data on all 228 firms, the authors were 
able to econometrically control for self-selection. The program participants demonstrated a 
positive and significant difference in financial outcomes including sales and financing, based on 
regression analysis. Their ability to control for self-selection is important because entry into the 
federally funded commercialization assistance programs is voluntary. While controlling for self-
selection is beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be considered in future research to compensate 
for the non-randomness of program participation.  
These two studies provide both rational and sample approaches to evaluating business 
advisory services. Business advisory services have been provided because small firms often have 
a gap in their current knowledge and what is required for success. Through a comparison group 
design Chrisman and McMullan (2004) found that Small Business Development Centers 
supported firms had higher firm survival rates. Cumming and Fisher (2012) employed regression 
techniques to control for possible self-selection bias, although beyond the scope of this project, 
their approach can be illustrative for future projects. 
2.4. Assessing the SBIR Program 
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The 2008 assessment of the SBIR program conducted by the National Research Council 
(2008) may be the most in-depth evaluation of the program. The National Research Council study 
sought to assess if the SBIR program has met congressional goals, with an emphasis on 
commercialization (National Research Council, 2008, p. 13). To complete the study, stakeholders 
from the five largest participating federal agencies (i.e., Department of Defense, Department of 
Energy, Health and Human Services, National Aeronautics and Aerospace Administration, and the 
National Science Foundation) were involved in case studies, symposiums, interviews, and surveys 
to determine how the program has functioned, and assess the program’s performance.  
The primary data source for the study was a survey that sought to, “understand both 
commercial and non-commercial aspects, including knowledge base impacts, of SBIR, and to gain 
insight into impacts of program management" (National Research Council, 2008, p. 229). The 
survey was administered in 2005 to SBIR Phase II award recipients between 1992 and 2001, using 
a 20 percent layered random sampling technique. The process started with a random sample of the 
entire award population, followed by a 20 percent random sample for each award year, with a final 
sample to ensure at least 20 percent of the agency's awards were included. The final result was a 
sample of 4,523 projects, of which, 1,916 responded to the survey, a 42 percent response rate.  
The National Research Council study found that the SBIR program was, "sound in concept 
and effective in practice" (National Research Council, 2008, p. 54). More specific to this thesis, 
the study found that 47 percent of the projects reported sales related to their SBIR funded project, 
indicating some commercial success. While not addressed in detail, the report also touched on the 
agencies’ implementation of commercialization assistance programs. While the study did not 
assess the outcomes of commercialization assistance programs, it showed federal agencies’ interest 
in supporting the commercialization process. A key theme in the discussion on commercialization 
assistance programs was the take-away from interviews with, "awardees, agency staff, and 
commercialization contractors, [all of whom] indicate[d] that the business side of commercial 
activities is often where companies experience the most difficulty” (National Research Council, 
2008, p. 223). This concept was reinforced by firms selected for case studies in the report, with 
seven out of the nine referencing participation in a support program specifying some level of value.  
The Phase II survey used by the National Research Council was, in many ways, built on 
previous work by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The General Accounting Office (1992) 
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conducted one of the first studies to measure private sector commercialization of SBIR Phase II 
awardees. Utilizing a census approach, GAO administered a questionnaire to Phase II award 
recipients between 1984 and 1987. While their approach found there was private-sector 
commercialization of the federally sponsored research and development, measured through both 
sales and additional development funding, they could not measure the effectiveness of the program 
because they lacked “formal criteria by which to judge the results, once they [were] determined” 
(General Accounting Office, 1992, p. 16). The GAO study uncovered the presence of private-
sector output, without indicating program effectiveness.   
A central contribution from the GAO study has been the measurement of 
commercialization through sales and additional development funding. GAO defined sales to, 
"include all sales of product(s), process(es), service(s), or other sales to federal or private-sector 
customers, resulting from the technology associated with the project." They defined additional 
development funding to, "include funding from federal or private-sector sources, from the 
companies themselves, or from other related SBIR awards used for further development of the 
technology associated with the Phase II project" (General Accounting Office, 1992, p. 20). These 
metrics have continued to be implemented in subsequent studies as measures of SBIR awardee 
private-sector commercialization, and will be used in this study as a proxy for the dependent binary 
commercialization variable.  
The National Research Council (2000) assessed the Department of Defense Fast Track 
Initiative, a program that provided interim funding to SBIR Phase I awardees during the period 
between Phase I and Phase II for projects that demonstrated third party matching funding (which 
was contingent on the project going to Phase II). These firms also received an expedited Phase II 
review process and were guaranteed Phase II selection given fulfillment of their Phase I technical 
goals and demonstration that the program was technically sufficient. To complete their assessment 
of the Fast Track program, the National Research Council developed and administered a survey 
instrument to a sample of Fast Track recipients and a control group. The project based survey 
covered 379 Phase II awards between 1992 and 1996. The survey resulted in a 72 percent response 
rate and was supplemented by 55 case studies. They found that the, "program was encouraging 
commercialization and attracting new firms to the program" (National Research Council, 2000, p. 
24). While the study continued to use the GAO established measurements of commercialization 
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success: presence of sales or additional development funding; the fast track initiative departed 
from previous efforts by surveying a sample of Phase II award winners and comparing their actual 
and expected results with a matched control group.  
The control group used in this methodology was matched on, "solicitation year, number of 
previous Phase II awards, size of the firm, geographic location, women or minority ownership, 
and technology area of the project" (National Research Council, 2000, p. 55). The factors used to 
match the control group offer insight into this project, and in a few aspects will be replicated during 
this study. While the National Research Council study utilized projects from other programs to 
develop its matched sample, this thesis will utilize Phase II awards that were eligible for the Navy 
TAP, but chose not to participate. 
While the reviewed literature thus far has sought to demonstrate or assess the presence of 
near-term commercialization impact, Lerner (1999) sought to answer the question of the long-term 
impact of the SBIR program by applying an empirical framework to the GAO (1992) data-set. 
Lerner (1999) utilized a matched pair design to measure the long-term employment and sales 
growth of 1,435 firms over a 10 year period (p. 286). To conduct the research he used a subset of 
541 SBIR firms from the GAO survey and matched them with two matched sets of similar firms-
-one based on industry and firm size, and the other based on location and firm size. Lerner found 
that the SBIR awardees enjoyed substantially greater employment and sales growth, although not 
uniform. The “superior growth of SBIR awardees was confined to firms based in ZIP codes with 
substantial venture capital activity” (Lerner, 1999, p. 290). Although Lerner utilized the GAO data 
set to analyze the long-term impact of SBIR in terms of employment and sales growth, the 
relationship of those outputs were more broadly attributed to the SBIR program without insight 
into the underlying drivers of commercialization.  
2.4.1. Commercialization Probability 
Link and Ruhm (2009) sought to isolate the variables that impact the probability of 
commercialization. Utilizing data on 405 NIH SBIR Phase II awardees from the National Research 
Council (National Research Council, 2008) assessment of the SBIR program, they estimated the 
probability of commercial success as a function of additional development funding and four 
control variables: knowledge base, owner demographics, NIH funding institute, and the presence 
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of university involvement. The authors found that the mean commercialization probability for NIH 
SBIR awardees was slightly more than 50 percent (.5111). The research of Link and Ruhm offers 
insight into a potential driver of commercialization of SBIR Phase II awards, specifically 
additional development funding. Utilizing their probit model, they identified the marginal benefit 
of additional development funding based on two subsets of NIH firms, those who reported 
additional development funding as part of the National Research Council study, and those who did 
not. They quantified the marginal effect of additional development funding, finding that it 
"correlates with a 35 percentage point increase in the probability of commercialization" (Link & 
Ruhm, 2009, p. 16). Their quantification of the contribution of control variable's impact on 
commercialization is informative for my research. They identified additional development as a key 
independent variable. While this project is focusing on participation in commercialization 
assistance programs, the general goal of these programs is to augment small firms’ capacity to 
secure commercialization funding, which would include both sales and additional development 
funding. Based on the work of Link and Ruhm, to the extent that commercialization assistance 
programs are effective, one would expect an increased probability of commercialization for 
program participants. 
 While their work was specific to NIH, subsequent work by Link and Scott (2010) took a 
closer look at the probability of success across the federal agencies participating in the National 
Research Council (2008) study. They examined the probability of commercialization success of 
SBIR Phase II awardees across the five largest participating agencies. They framed their research 
as an effort to quantify the risk government incurs when it serves as an entrepreneur. Utilizing data 
collected as part of the National Research Council's assessment of the SBIR program, the authors 
developed an econometric model using data for each agency to quantify the level of risk the 
respective agencies incurred. Link and Scott (2010) found that the mean probability that companies 
would commercialize their SBIR research was, "somewhat less than .50, the probability of heads 
on the toss of a fair coin" (p. 599). If government as an entrepreneur accepts a 50 percent chance 
of failure when seeding an SBIR Phase II project, it would be reasonable to conclude that the 
development and funding of a commercialization assistance program would be focused on 
reducing that failure probability. While their research included a large number of control variables, 
participation in transition or commercialization assistance program was not among them. Their 
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work provides a framework for further understanding the role commercialization assistance 
programs can play as a risk mitigation strategy.  
 
3. Research Design 
I hypothesize that the Navy's Transition Assistance Program (TAP) increases the 
probability of commercialization success for SBIR Phase II projects. To test my hypothesis I will 
apply a logistic regression model to the population of treated projects between 2005 and 2008,7 
and a comparison group of eligible projects that chose not to participate in the program during the 
same period. Previous outcome evaluations of the SBIR program have identified 
commercialization as a key indicator of program success, defining the measure as any non-SBIR 
sales or additional development funding received (General Accounting Office 1992, National 
Research Council, 2004, National Research Council 2008). A lack of market knowledge and 
marketing skills was a frequently cited commercialization obstacle by SBIR awardees (Cooper, 
2003). Commercialization Assistance Programs, like the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program, 
seek to overcome these obstacles by providing project level marketing, business strategy, and 
transition support. This research will seek to determine the effectiveness, measured by the odds of 
success between the treated and non-treated projects, of the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program 
(TAP) by modeling a binary project level commercialization variable.  
H1: Navy Transition Assistance Program increases the probability of project 
 commercialization.  
3.1. Threats to Validity 
My research design limits the ability to generalize these findings beyond the Navy 
Transition Assistance Program (TAP). The design is a non-experimental design, and these projects 
may not be representative of the broader SBIR/STTR community. There are other programmatic 
                                                 
7
 The Navy TAP is an 11-month program and provides firms the option of participating in the first or second 
year of their Phase II award. Choosing 2008 as the cutoff ensured that projects had exhausted their Navy TAP 
eligibility and would have completed the program by the time the dataset was assembled.  
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characteristics which limit the ability to broadly generalize these findings to commercialization 
assistance programs. Among these include differences in vendors, acquisition versus commercial 
focused support, program components, and per project support investments. 
The voluntary nature of the Transition Assistance Program introduces the prospect of 
selection bias. Program participants may possess unobserved characteristics and motivations that 
may not be reflected across both the treated and comparison populations. While I recognize this 
possibility, accounting for potential selection bias is beyond the scope of this research. By not 
accounting for the potential of selection bias, findings cannot be solely attributable to the 
intervention, but must be given with the caveat that there may be unobserved factors inherent to 
the project or firm.  
A possible threat to internal validity is the potential underreporting of commercialization 
outcomes between the treatment and comparison groups. While this is discussed later, I should 
note that the commercialization data is self-reported by the firms. A smaller percentage of the 
treated projects provided a commercialization update than the comparison group. To guard against 
mistakenly over reporting the impact of the treatment, a separate lower bound analysis will be 
employed.  
3.1.1. Question of Causality  
While I have mentioned concerns over potential selection bias and the limitations of this 
dataset to address them, I feel it is important to discuss the potential impact of selection bias as it 
relates to causality and my results. While the results indicate that projects that participated in the 
Navy TAP feature higher odds of success compared to the non-participating counterparts, 
questions can be raised regarding the underlying projects. It is possible that projects entering the 
TAP have higher prospects for commercialization compared to those not entering the program. It 
is also possible that firms when deciding on which projects to enter into the program may chose 
not to enter projects they feel have miniscule opportunities for commercialization. Experimentally 
ascertaining the answer to the underlying nature of the projects entering the TAP versus those not 
entering the TAP is not feasible given the non-experimental development of this dataset. With that 
stated, I do not believe that the underlying projects entering the TAP are more commercializable 
than those not entering the program.  
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It is known, based on vendor experience that firms do make tradeoff decisions on which 
projects to enter into the program. As shared by Dr. Jenny Servo, president of Dawnbreaker,8 when 
principal investigators have multiple eligible projects but lack the bandwidth to shepherd all their 
projects through the program, they are advised by Dawnbreaker to opt-in the project which requires 
the most support (personal communication, June 18, 2014). It is Dawnbreaker’s belief that through 
the market research and under their business advisement they can add more clarity into avenues of 
commercialization for theses more challenging projects. Also, from the perspective of the vendor, 
if a firm has a transition or commercialization path identified, they may be less willing to invest 
the necessary time to complete the program. The time commitment is a key factor why I do not 
believe participants are entering what they perceive as more commercializable projects.  
I do not believe firms would knowingly enter projects they sensed to have higher 
commercialization prospects. The TAP requires nearly a 1-year time commitment to participate 
and complete the program. It is unclear to me why a firm would invest those resources to 
participate if they knew their projects were aligned for success. Although the services of the TAP 
are paid on behalf of the firm, the program is gated, and requires iterative activity between the firm 
and Dawnbreaker (vendor executing the TAP). As stated previously, the time commitment in the 
program ensures that participating firms have “skin in the game.” The collaborative and continual 
development of program deliverables requires firm participants to invest their own resources—
which cannot be billed to their contracts. This commitment was expressed by a TAP participant in 
congressional testimony, “The [TAP] program is voluntary for Navy Phase-II winners, and 
requires a commitment in time and money from the company to participate” (McKinney, 2011, 
p.11). I do not believe firms would invest these additional resources to participate if they felt their 
projects had a higher than average prospect for success. Based upon these factors and my 
interactions with a number of SBIR/STTR project participants, I do not believe the TAP is solely 
reflecting results of more commercializable projects.  
3.2. Data Sources 
                                                 
8
 Dr. Servo executes the Navy TAP, and is my employer.  
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I utilized the Navy's public SBIR and STTR advanced search engine9 to begin compiling 
the dataset. The database contains project data on Navy SBIR and STTR awards, including 
summary reports and information on Navy TAP participants. Through this database I was able to 
identify the population of Navy SBIR and STTR Phase II award winners for fiscal years 2005 
through 2008, including the subpopulation of TAP program participants. These data were merged 
with the proprietary DoD commercialization database which contains project level, self-reported, 
commercialization data on SBIR and STTR Phase II awards. The two datasets were matched based 
on a one-on-one match of project contract number.  
The DoD commercialization database captures cumulative SBIR project level 
commercialization data. The DoD requires SBIR Phase II award winners to update project 
outcomes on previous awards any time they apply for new DoD SBIR awards, one year after the 
start of their Phase II award, and at the completion of their Phase II. The DoD also requests annual 
updates following completion of the project (National Research Council, 2009, p. 120). While 
relying upon self-reported data may lead to certain bias’s, like under/over reporting, I believe the 
DoD reporting requirements and the necessity for project updates to be digitally certified by firm 
officials minimizes any concerns. Evidence of the high level of compliance can be seen in Table 
1, where 94.5 percent of the population of Navy Phase II projects during the fiscal years of interest 
provided an update to the DoD commercialization database.  
Although the DoD commercialization database captures a high percentage of the projects, 
there is variation between the percentage of captured projects amongst the treatment and 
comparison groups. I will describe the sample selection process later but, it is important to note 
that the treatment group has a smaller number of projects providing updates than the comparison 
group (81 percent versus 89 percent, respectively). This could indicate an underreporting bias. I 
assume two possible scenarios: one, the projects followed a similar pattern of success but failed to 
report; or, two, they were unsuccessful and chose not to report their lack of commercialization. 
Scenario one would lead to understating of the interventions impact. Under the second scenario, 
the potential bias may result in the overstating of the interventions impact. To protect against 
overstating the impact, I will add a sensitivity model under the assumption that the treated projects 
                                                 
9
 https://www.navysbirsearch.com/?  
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who failed to report were unsuccessful. This model can be viewed as the lower bound of the 
intervention's impact.  
3.3. Sample Selection 
Population of Navy Phase II SBIR and STTR Awards 
The population of Navy Phase II SBIR and STTR awards are defined as all projects 
captured in the DoD commercialization database with award start dates between fiscal years 2005 
and 2008. There are 1,174 such projects (Table 1). These projects constitute the eligible population 
from which the treatment and comparison groups were selected.  
Table 1 Population of Navy Phase II Awards 
Fiscal Year Phase II 
Awards 
Awards w/ 
CCR Update 
Percentage 
Captured by 
CCR 
2005 312 286 91.7% 
2006 251 240 95.6% 
2007 262 254 96.9% 
2008 349 340 97.4% 
Totals 1174 1120 95.4% 
 
3.3.1. Treatment Group 
The treatment group is defined as Navy TAP graduates who have provided an update to 
the DoD commercialization database during the month of, or after, program completion. As seen 
in Table 2, there were 664 TAP graduates between fiscal years 2005 and 2008. From this 
population, 537 (81 percent) provided a post-intervention update to the DoD commercialization 
database. The 127 projects who do not meet the defined criteria will be excluded from the base 
modeling. Excluding these projects may lead to an over (or under) stating of the programmatic 
impact.  
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Table 2 Population of Navy Phase II Projects Considered for the Treatment Group (Projects that participated in 
the Transition Assistance Program (TAP))  
Fiscal 
Year 
Population 
of TAP 
Projects 
TAP 
Projects 
w/ CCR 
Update 
Percentage 
Captured 
by CCR 
TAP w/ Post 
Intervention 
Update 
Percentage 
of TAP in 
Treatment 
# of 
TAP 
excluded 
2005 181 173 95.6% 158 91% 15 
2006 150 146 97.3% 120 82% 26 
2007 148 147 99.3% 113 77% 34 
2008 199 198 99.5% 146 74% 52 
Totals 678 664 98% 537 81% 127 
 
As stated previously, two assumptions may be made regarding the population of excluded 
projects. Under one scenario, I can assume they followed a similar pattern of success but failed to 
report, which would understate the programmatic impact. Alternatively, I can assume they were 
unsuccessful and chose not to report, which would overstate the programmatic impact. To protect 
against the latter, I will develop a sensitivity model under the second assumption to protect against 
overstating the programmatic impact. This subsequent model will serve as a lower bound for the 
programmatic impact.  
3.3.2. Comparison Group 
The comparison group is defined as the untreated (chose not to participate in the Navy 
TAP) population of Navy Phase II awards captured by the DoD commercialization database. The 
comparison group population consists of 456 projects between fiscal years 2005 and 2008, as seen 
in Table 3. The possibility for spillover effects between the treatment and comparison groups 
exists. The Transition Assistance Program is a project level intervention, meaning, firms with 
multiple Phase II awards during the period of interest may have entered only a subset of those 
awards in the treatment.  
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Table 3 Population of Navy Phase II Awards used for the Comparison Group 
Fiscal 
Year 
Population of Non-
TAP Projects 
Non-TAP Projects 
w/ CCR Update 
Percentage 
Captured by CCR 
2005 139 113 81% 
2006 105 94 90% 
2007 115 107 93% 
2008 151 142 94% 
Totals 510 456 89% 
 
Since I posit a positive impact from the treatment (participation in the Navy TAP), I would 
expect the model to quantify a probability of commercialization success higher for the treatment 
group than the comparison group. However, with the presence of firm spillovers, the programmatic 
impact may be understated--depending on the proportion of multiple project firms split across the 
treatment and comparison groups. I subset the larger model based on firm project characteristics 
to shed light on these potential spillover effects. While this sub-setting may indicate the presence 
of spillover and signal the direction of their impact, fully accounting for those effects are beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but it is worth noting for future research designs.  
3.4. Dataset 
The resulting dataset contains 993 projects, 537 in the treatment and 456 in the comparison 
group. As seen in Table 4, the treatment group has a statistically significant higher percentage of 
projects reporting commercialization compared to the comparison group. The treatment group also 
has a statistically higher average Phase II award amount, a variable that will be included in the 
model as a control. Under the lower bound scenario, I assumed that the 127 projects that 
participated in the TAP, but failed to provide an update to the DoD commercialization database, 
were unsuccessful. Under this assumption the difference in commercialization percentages 
between the groups was reduced to 13 percentage points. The difference remains statistically 
significant. This data as well as the year by year commercialization percentages for the treatment 
and comparison groups can be seen in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively. 
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Table 4 Selected Descriptive Statistics for Treatment and Comparison Groups 
 Treatment Comparison Difference 
Sample Size (n) 537 456 81 
Number Commercialized  390 212 178 
Commercialization 
Percentage  
73% 46% 26%* 
Total Commercialization $806,245,836 $465,414,980 $340,830,856 
Commercialization Average $1,501,389 $1,020,647 $480,742 
 
   
Phase II Award Average $1,001,644 $879,468 $122,176* 
Phase II Sponsoring Component Project Distribution 
MARCOR 4% 4%  
NAVAIR 41% 42%  
NAVFAC 0% 1%  
NAVSEA 24% 21%  
NAVSUP 0% 0%  
NSMA 1% 1%  
ONR 24% 25%  
OSD 0% 0%  
SPAWAR 6% 4%  
SSP 0% 1%  
*Significant at .05 level. 
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Table 5 Number of Projects and Commercialization Percentages by FY (Treatment and Comparison Groups) 
Fiscal Year Treatment Commercialization 
Percentage 
Comparison  Commercialization 
Percentage 
2005 158 77% 113 53% 
2006 120 73% 94 52% 
2007 113 73% 107 45% 
2008 146 66% 142 39% 
Totals 537 73% 456 46% 
 
3.4.1. Descriptive Analysis of Dataset 
As seen in Table 4, the resulting dataset indicates differences in the means across a number 
of variables. This section takes a closer look at these variables and describes their role in the 
regression model. 
3.4.2. Phase II Award Amount 
I believe projects receiving higher levels of funding are better positioned to develop their 
technology, which may in turn move them closer to a product, or make them more attractive to 
outside investors. Based on this belief, I hypothesize that the level of Phase II project funding has 
a positive impact on the probability of commercialization. The distribution of Phase II award 
amounts between the treatment and comparison groups can be seen in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 Phase II Award Amounts: Treatment versus Comparison 
As seen in the figure inset, the treatment group (TAP=1) has a median Phase II award amount 
of $749,997 compared to a median award level of $749,624 for the comparison cohort, a difference 
of a little more than $300. This isn’t surprising because, during the fiscal years covered, the SBIR 
policy guidelines provided a $750,000 soft cap for Phase II awards. Processes were in place to 
allow agencies to exceed those aforementioned guidelines, which is reflected in the comparison of 
Phase II award averages.  
The average Phase II award for treatment projects is slightly greater than $1 million, compared 
to just under $880 thousand for the comparison group. The differences between the two 
populations can be seen in the box plot presented in Figure 4. While both populations share the 
same median location, the third quartile and upper limits are more extended for the treatment 
group. The treatment group also contains a larger concentration of outliers on the higher end of 
the scale, including the two highest Phase II award projects, both receiving close to $6 million.  
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Figure 4 Boxplot of Phase II Award Amount: TAP versus Non-TAP 
The net difference between the cohorts in average Phase II award funding is $122,000, 
which is statistically significance at the 95 percent level. I will include Phase II award funding in 
the regression model. 
3.4.3. Number of Employees 
It is unclear the impact, if any, the size of the SBIR firm has on project commercialization 
outcomes. I anticipate that the smaller firms, when measured by number of employees, may have 
a more difficult time commercializing their SBIR technology. They may not have sufficient 
staffing to address their market research or business development needs. To explore this impact, I 
included the number of employees at the time the firm submitted their SBIR Phase II proposal. 
The distribution of employees between the cohorts can be seen in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 Distribution of # of Employees: TAP versus Non-TAP 
Projects opting not to participate in the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) tend to be 
larger when measured by number of employees. The comparison group has a median number of 
employees of 33, and an average of 66. Both measures are higher than the treatment group, which 
has a median number of employees of 21, and a mean of 43.5. Close to 60 percent of the projects 
in the treatment group are from firms will less than 30 employees, compared to less than 50 percent 
for the comparison group. Figure 6 displays a boxplot of the number of employees for both the 
treatment and comparison groups.  
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Figure 6 Boxplot of Number of Employees TAP vs. Non-TAP 
As seen in the boxplot, firms with more than 100 employees are considered an outlier within 
the treatment cohort, while, the comparison group’s outliers begin around 200 employees. The 
difference in mean number of employees between the subpopulations is statistically significant at 
the 95 percent level. I will include number of employees in the model to understand if the success 
probability changes with size (as measured by number of employees).  
3.4.4. Geographic Location 
The distribution of projects contained in this dataset originates from 48 of the 50 states, as 
seen in Figure 7. Lerner (1999) found that SBIR awardees based in zip codes with substantial 
venture capital activity experienced superior growth compared to their counterparts. Recognizing 
that geographic location may impact project commercialization, I compressed the states into the 
four U.S. Census based regions—West, South, Midwest, and Northeast—and include them as an 
exploratory dummy variable in the model.  
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Figure 7 Distribution by State of Navy Phase II Awards w/in Dataset (2004-2008) 
3.4.5. Funding Component 
The systems commands within the Navy represent various functional responsibilities, 
technological interests, and resources. The implications of these variations and impact on SBIR 
project outcomes are unclear. I explore differences in success probabilities by adding sponsoring 
components as an exploratory dummy variable to the model.  
3.5. Research Design Summary 
I hypothesize that commercialization assistance programs increase the probability of 
commercial outcomes of SBIR Phase II projects. Utilizing secondary data sources, I have 
developed a treatment group comprised on the population of Navy Transition Assistance Program 
(TAP) participants who provided commercialization updates following program completion, and 
a comparison group from the population of projects who were eligible but chose not to participate 
in the Navy Transition Assistance Program. The resulting sample is 993 projects, 537 in the 
treatment group, and 456 in a comparison group, a sufficiently sized sample to test my hypothesis. 
This project will quantify the impact participation in commercialization assistance programs has 
on the on the odds of success and the estimated success probabilities, subject to the other control 
variables (i.e., Award amount, Number of employees, Geography, and Sponsoring component). 
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The results will help policy makers and program managers explore commercialization assistance 
as a policy option to enhance commercialization outcomes.  
 
4. Developing the Model 
Probability (commercialization) = f(Technical Assistance; Controls)  
4.1. Dependent Variable: Commercialization 
The dependent variable is project level commercialization, which is appropriate given the 
project level intervention of the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP). Commercialization 
has been consistently defined as sales or non-SBIR additional development funding related to the 
SBIR award (General Accounting Office, 1992; National Research Council, 2003; and National 
Research Council, 2008). The purpose of the Navy Transition Assistance Program is to increase 
the likelihood of participants receiving Phase III (non-SBIR) funding. Given this goal, I decided 
to use project level commercialization as a binary instead of a continuous variable. Descriptively, 
the cumulative commercialization outcomes of TAP participants are on average $480 thousand 
higher than non-participants (see Table 4). While the cumulative commercialization outcomes are 
important to demonstrate a return on investment from federal expenditures on research and 
development; given the emphasis of the TAP—orienting firms to seek commercialization—I 
believe the percentage of projects successfully securing funding is a more appropriate 
measurement. This project will represent commercialization as a dichotomous variable taking the 
value of 1, if the project reported any non-SBIR funding, and 0 otherwise. 
4.2. Explanatory Variable: Transition Assistance Program 
I posit that participation in the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program increases the 
probability of project commercialization success. To test this hypothesis I included a dichotomous 
explanatory variable taking the value of 1 if the project is in the treatment group (Navy TAP 
participant) and a 0 otherwise (comparison).  
4.3. Control Variables 
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Phase II Award Amount: I hypothesize that the level of Phase II project funding has a 
positive impact on the probability of commercialization. I believe projects receiving higher levels 
of funding are better positioned to develop their technology, and in turn may be closer to a product 
or more attractive to outside investors.  
Number of Employees: I will include the number of employees at the time of award as an 
exploratory variable. I do not posit a relationship; however, given the differences in size between 
the treatment and comparison groups, I will add the variable to explore if success probabilities 
vary based on firm size characteristics.  
Geographic location: I do not posit a relationship to geographic location, but will add 
regional location as an exploratory dummy variable to ascertain if geographic differences impact 
project commercialization outcomes.  
Sponsoring Components: variation in resources and authority vary across the Navy's 
sponsoring components. While I do not posit a direction or magnitude of impact, I do propose 
exploring potential differences in sponsoring components commercialization outcomes. 
 
5. Treatment versus Comparison: Odds of Success 
The primary focus of this research is to assess the impact participation in the Navy’s 
Transition Assistance Program (TAP), a commercialization assistance program, has on the 
probability of project commercialization success. To that end the principal explanatory variable is 
a dichotomous participation variable, taking the value of 1 if the project is in the treatment group 
(participated in the TAP), and a 0 otherwise. To measure this impact I am utilizing available data 
on projects who chose to participate in the program (treatment group) and those who were eligible 
but chose not to participate (comparison group), to identify if statistically significant differences 
exist in the groups odds of success. 
5.1. Treatment as a Single Predictor of Success 
Although it would be a rather large assumption to assume the only relevant differences 
between the treatment and comparison groups was their participation in the Navy Transition 
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Assistance Program (TAP), I see value in developing a single predictor model to the measure the 
impact of the TAP prior to including the control variables. This cross classification process can 
indicate the presence and significance of any differences between the two groups solely as it relates 
to being in the treatment or comparison group.   
The 2x2 contingency table I developed based on the population of observations can be seen 
in Table 6. The table classifies commercialization success across the treatment and comparison 
groups. The table was set up with the participation variable as the explanatory variable and 
commercialization as the response. As seen in Table 6, the proportion of the treatment group 
reporting commercialization success is 390/537, or .73. Meaning seven-out-of-ten of the projects 
participating in the Navy TAP reported some level of non-SBIR commercialization funding 
following program completion. Just under half of the projects in the comparison group reported 
commercialization success (212/456, or .46). The difference in success proportions between the 
treatment and comparison groups is .26, with an estimated standard of error of .0656.  
Table 6 Treatment versus Comparison 2x2 Contingency Table 
Project Commercialization (1-Commercialized, 0-Otherwise) 
Group 1 0 Total 
Navy TAP (Treatment- 1) 390 147 537 
Non-TAP (Comparison - 0) 212 244 456 
Total 602 391 993 
 
Based on the point estimate of .26 for the difference in sample proportions and a standard 
error of .0656, I am 95 percent confident that the difference in success proportion for the treatment 
compared to the comparison is at least 13 percent and at most 39 percent higher. Meaning a 
significant difference exists between the treatment and the comparison groups, with the treatment 
having a greater proportion of projects reporting commercialization. 
While the percentage difference between the sample proportions may not appear highly 
impactful, a closer examination of the odds of success between the treatment and comparison 
groups makes clearer the impact of the Navy Transition Assistance Program. The estimated odds 
of commercialization success given that a project participated in the TAP is 3.05 times the 
estimated odds of those in the comparison group. I can be 95 percent confident that the estimated 
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probability of commercialization success for the treatment is at least 2.34 times, to at most 3.97 
times, the comparison group. Assuming the sole explanation for commercialization outcome 
differences between Navy TAP participants and the comparison is the intervention, the Navy TAP 
participants estimated odds of success would be at least double the projects in the comparison 
group.  
5.1.2. Model Results: Predicted Success Probabilities 
Using the dichotomous treatment explanatory variable as a single predictor indicated that 
graduates of the Transition Assistance Program estimated odds of success were 3.05 times the 
estimated of odds of success for non-participating projects. This method of analysis does not 
account for potential differences in outcomes based on other variables. To explore this possibility, 
I ran a logistical regression model on the 993 observations in the dataset incorporating the control 
variables as explained in section 4. The Odds Ratio estimates resulting from this model can be 
seen in Table 7.  
Table 7 Logistical regression: Commercialization Success TAP versus Non-TAP (n=993) 
Parameter Odds Ratio 
Estimate 
Standard Error 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Treatment (TAP versus Non-TAP) 2.768**** 0.1394 (2.109, 3.643) 
lnawardamount 2.130**** 0.1591 (1.568, 2.929) 
NumEmployee 0.997*** .000949 (0.995, 0.999) 
Region_Midwest vs. South 1.346 0.2453 (0.836, 2.191) 
Region_Northeast vs. South 1.244 0.1745 (0.884, 1.753) 
Region_West vs. South 1.230 0.1813 (0.863, 1.757) 
Component_MARCOR vs. Other 0.532 0.5386 (0.182, 1.519) 
Component_NAVAIR vs. Other 0.466* 0.4406 (0.191,  1.089) 
Component_NAVSEA vs. Other 0.606 0.4521 (0.243, 1.449) 
Component_ONR vs. Other 0.593 0.4457 (0.240, 1.401) 
Component_SPAWAR vs. Other 0.515 0.5405 (0.175, 1.477) 
Chi-Square Test Statistics (Alpha): *=.10; **= .05; ***= .01; **** = .0001. 
 
As seen in Table 7, neither the regional or component dummy parameters are significant, 
except for the NAVAIR component (at an alpha of .10). Although the continuous variable for the 
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number of employees is significant at a 99 percent level of confidence, the confidence interval for 
the odds ratio provides a statistically insignificant result. In lieu of these findings, I removed the 
regional and component variables, and compressed the continuous number of employees into an 
ordinal variable. The updated model results are displayed in Table 8. 
Table 8 Reduced Logistical regression results for commercialization of TAP versus Non-TAP Participants (n=993) 
Parameter Odds Ratio Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Treatment (TAP versus Non-TAP) 2.753**** 0.1390 (2.099, 3.621) 
lnawardamount 1.992**** 0.1531 (1.483, 2.706) 
Nemploy (1 vs. 5) 3.74*** 0.4099 (1.719, 8.699) 
Nemploy (2 vs. 5) 4.162*** 0.4323 (1.827, 10.079) 
Nemploy (3 vs. 5) 3.284*** 0.4228 (1.47, 7.821) 
Nemploy (4 vs. 5) 2.69** 0.4809 (1.068, 7.116) 
Chi-Square Test Statistics (Alpha): *=.10; **= .05; ***= .01; **** = .0001. 
 
The updated model shows that while holding other variables constant, the odds of 
commercialization success for a Navy TAP project are 2.75 times the odds of success for a project 
in the comparison group. Adding additional variables (natural log of Phase II award size) and the 
bracketed number of employees impacted the odds ratio. Using the treatment as the sole predictor 
resulted in an odds ratio of 3.05, while the fuller model resulted in an odds ratio of 2.75. To 
understand the impact of the treatment across firm and project award sizes, I calculated the 
estimated probability of success for a project with a median Phase II award amount ($749,949) 
across the firm size brackets. The Navy TAP graduates held a higher predicted probability of 
success across the size dimensions. The full results can be seen in Table 9. 
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Table 9 Estimated Success Probabilities by Firm Size and Median Phase II Award ($749,949): TAP versus Non-TAP 
Estimated Success Probability 
Firm Size  TAP Non-TAP 
Nemploy (<25) 72% 48% 
Nemploy (25 to 49) 74% 51% 
Nemploy (50 to 149) 69% 45% 
Nemploy (150 to 249) 65% 40% 
Nemploy (250+) 41% 20% 
 
5.2. Unique Firms 
 Although my focus is to isolate project level commercialization outcomes as a function of 
participating in the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP), differences amongst firms’ 
success winning SBIR Phase II awards could potentially impact results. Reviewing the 
composition of firms in the dataset reveals that the 993 projects are represented by 557 unique 
firms. Figure 8 displays a histogram of the number of projects won by unique firms.  
 
Figure 8 Firm Demographics Overall Dataset 
 As seen in the histogram, 379 out of the 557 unique firms (68 percent) won a single project 
during the years of interest. However, the cumulative number of projects from these firms 
represents 38 percent of the projects contained in the dataset. This shows a high concentration of 
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repeat winners within the Navy SBIR program. In contrast, firms winning two or more awards 
during the period of interest account for 62 percent of all projects. To understand the implications 
of this distribution, the proportion of successes and total commercialization funding was found for 
both the single project and the multiple project firms, and analyzed for statistical differences 
between the groups. This information can be seen in Table 10. 
Table 10 Proportion of Success amongst Firms: Single Project Winners vs. Multiple Project Winners 
 Commercialization Success (1-Reported Funding, 0-Otherwise) 
Group # of 
Firms 
# of 
Projects 
Commercialization 
Percentage  
Total 
Commercialization 
Single Project Firms 379 379 53% $362,148,069 
Multiple Project Firms 
2-3 Projects 127 284 66% $398,496,878 
4-5 Projects 28 124 71% $100,921,198 
6+ Projects 23 206 60% $410,094,671 
Multiple Project Firms 
Totals 
178 614 65% $909,512,747 
Totals 557 993 61% $1,271,660,816 
 
 There is nearly a 12 percentage point difference in the proportion of success for multiple 
award winners compared to single project firms overall. It is also evident that less than 5 percent 
of the unique companies (23 companies winning 6+ projects) account for nearly a third (32 
percent) of all reported commercialization funding. This finding is not unique. It was found that 
the 7 percent of firms winning the most Phase II awards accounted for 60 percent of SBIR 
commercialization (National Research Council, 2008, p. 156). The prevalence of concentrated 
success amongst a small subset of repeat winners is characteristic of the SBIR and STTR programs, 
and not specific to the Navy or the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP). Nonetheless, to 
understand if the probability of success changes given these firm characteristics, I developed 
separate contingency tables for the two subsets and analyzed their odds of success.  
5.3. Single Project Firms 
As stated previously, 557 unique firms won the 993 projects contained in this dataset. 
Although 68 percent of the firms represented in the dataset are unique, the distribution of projects 
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amongst unique firms is skewed. This section explores the proportion of success amongst the 379 
single project firms based on their exposure, or lack thereof, to the treatment. As seen in Table 11, 
52 percent of single-firm projects were exposed to the Navy TAP.  
Table 11 Firm w/ Single Project Contingency Table 
Project Commercialization (1-Commercialized, 0-Otherwise) 
Singe Project Firms 1 0 Percentage 
of Projects 
Navy TAP (Treatment)  67% 33% 52% 
Non-TAP (Comparison) 38% 62% 48% 
Total 53% 47%  
  
Cross classifying these subsets based on commercialization outcomes across the treatment 
and comparison groups reveals that those exposed to the Navy TAP had a success proportion of 
.67. The proportion of projects in the comparison group reporting commercialization is .38. The 
difference in success proportions between the treatment and comparison groups is .29, with an 
estimated standard error of .0491. I am 95 percent confident that the difference in success 
proportion for the treatment compared to the comparison is at least 19 percent and at most 39 
percent higher. Within the subset of single project firms, a significant difference exists between 
the treatment and the comparison group, with the treatment having a greater proportion of projects 
reporting commercialization. The estimated odds of commercialization success given that a project 
within this subset participated in the TAP is 3.3 times the estimated odds of those in the comparison 
group. I can be 95 percent confident that the estimated probability of commercialization success 
for the treatment are at least 2.2 times to at most 5 times those of the comparison group. Single 
project firms that participated in the Navy TAP estimated odds of success are at least double those 
in the comparison group.  
5.3.1. Single Project Firms Model 
The dataset contains 993 project level observations represented by 557 unique firms. A 
subset of those firms had a single project during the period of interest, allowing comparisons 
without any concerns of spillover impacts from firms with multiple projects. I ran a separate 
logistical regression model based on this subset of one-time winners. Reducing the model in this 
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manner made the number of employees insignificant, and thus it was removed. The model results 
can be seen in Table 12. 
Table 12 Logistical regression results for Single Project Firms for TAP versus Non-TAP Participants (n=379) 
Parameter Odds Ratio Standard Error 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Treatment (TAP versus Non-TAP) 3.025**** 0.2190 (1.976, 4.666) 
lnawardamount 1.908** 0.2528 (1.178, 3.186) 
Chi-Square Test Statistics (Alpha): *=.10; **= .05; ***= .01; **** = .0001. 
 
 For the subset of single-winning firms, the model indicates that the estimated odds for 
success are 3.03 times the odds of success for a project in the comparison group, slightly lower 
than if the TAP was used as the sole predictor of success (3.3). The probability of success estimate 
for a median sized Phase II project ($749,949) participating in the TAP is 65 percent compared to 
38 percent for a comparison project. Amongst the subset of single-project firms, without concerns 
of spillover effects, the estimated odds of success are at least double the odds of success for projects 
in the comparison group.  
5.4. Multiple Project Firms 
A subset of firms (178) accounted for 62 percent of the sample projects. As discussed 
previously, the success proportion of this cohort relative to the single project firms was statistically 
significant, with the multiple project firms reporting a higher proportion of success. The presence 
of multiple-award winners can indicate endogenous firm factors as a possible explanation of 
success. The characteristics that have allowed these firms to win multiple Phase II awards, may 
also contribute to, or drive, their commercialization success. These firms further complicate the 
understanding of programmatic impact due to the possibility of spillover effects. Since the Navy 
TAP is a project level intervention, not all of a firm’s projects may be exposed to the treatment; 
however, to the extent that transferable learning occurs, the benefits of a single project could 
impact the outcomes of others. The potential for spillovers effects can be seen in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 Multiple Project Firms 
The graph looks at project participation by firms with multiple projects. The combination 
cluster shows that 71 multiple project firms split their projects by entering at least one of them in 
the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP). These 71 firms won 4.6 projects, on average, 
during the period covered. They cumulatively accounted for 328, or a third of all, projects. Their 
decision to enter a subset of projects into the treatment reinforces the possibility of spillovers; 
however, a full analytic accounting of such impact is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Of the multiple project firms, 107 made the decision to enter all or none of their projects 
into the Navy Transition Assistance Program. These subsets provide some insight into if 
commercialization outcomes amongst multi-project firms are impacted by participation in the 
program. The earlier analysis of multiple project firms, irrespective of program participation, 
demonstrated that they featured a higher proportion of success compared to single project firms. 
To measure the TAP impact amongst this group, I cross classified the subset of firms that entered 
all, or none, of their projects in the TAP. This eliminates concerns regarding spillovers based on a 
firm entering a subset of their projects. This classification can be seen in Table 13.  
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Table 13 Firm w/ Multiple Projects Contingency Table 
Project Commercialization (1-Commercialized, 0-Otherwise) 
Multiple Project Firms # of Firms 1 0 Total Projects 
TAP Only (Treatment ) 71 138 42 180 
Non-TAP Only (Comparison) 36 50 56 106 
Total 107 188 98 286 
  
The multiple project TAP-Only  firms (firm entered all of their eligible projects in the Navy 
TAP) have a success proportion of 138/180, or .77, compared to a success proportion of 50/106, 
or .47 for the comparison group (multiple project winners who did not enter any of their projects 
in the TAP). The difference in success proportions between the treatment and comparison groups 
is .30, with an estimated standard of error of .0577. Analysis of this subset of multiple project firms 
demonstrates a statistically significant difference between the treatment and comparison groups. 
The estimated odds of commercialization success given that a project within this subset 
participated in the TAP is 3.7 times the estimated odds of those in the comparison group. I can be 
95 percent confident that the estimated probability of commercialization success for the treatment 
is at least 2.2 times to at most 6.2 times those of the comparison group.  
5.4.1. Multiple Project Firms Model: TAP-ONLY vs. Non-TAP ONLY 
Amongst the multiple project firms, 107 of them made the decision to solely enter their 
projects into the TAP, or to entirely bypass the program during the period of interest. There were 
180 projects represented by 71 unique firms that entered all of their eligible projects into a 
Transition Assistance Program, compared to 106 projects represented by 36 unique firms who 
bypassed the program entirely. A logistical regression model, similar to the one for one-time 
participants, was run to understand if multiple winning firms muted the impact of the Transition 
Assistance Program (TAP). Based on the model results, the TAP cohort featured 3.6 times the 
odds of success when compared to the comparison group. The results of the model can be seen in 
Table 14. 
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Table 14 Logistical regression results for Multple Project Firms w/o program overlap (n=286) 
Parameter Odds Ratio Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Treatment (TAP versus Non-TAP) 3.581**** 0.2651 (2.139, 6.060) 
lnawardamount 1.871** 0.2714 (1.112, 3.256) 
Chi-Square Test Statistics (Alpha): *=.10; **= .05; ***= .01; **** = .0001. 
 
5.4.2. Multiple Project Firms: Potential Spillover Effects 
Another subset of multiple project firms split their projects between the treatment and 
comparison groups. While the underlying rationale for the decision to enter certain projects in the 
program over others is unclear, the results of that decision could serve as an indicator of 
intervention spillover effects. Thus far the analysis has consistently shown a higher proportion of 
success for the treatment compared to the comparison. Examining this subset can reveal if the 
impact is muted or eliminated. The success outcomes of the 71 firms who decided to split projects 
between the treatment and comparison can be seen in Table 15.  
Table 15 Firm w/ Multiple Projects Split Between Treatment and Comparison 
Project Commercialization (1-Commercialized, 0-Otherwise) 
Multiple Project Firms 1 0 Percentage of Projects 
TAP Only (Treatment ) 75% 25% 49% 
Non-TAP Only (Comparison) 55% 45% 51% 
Total 65% 35%  
  
As seen in the table, the projects that were exposed to the treatment have a success 
proportion of .75, compared to a success proportion of .55 for the comparison group. The 
difference in success proportions between the treatment and comparison groups is .19, with an 
estimated standard of error of .0514. The difference is significant and a 95 percent confidence 
interval indicates that the proportion for the treatment is at least 9 percent and at most 29 percent 
higher than the comparison.  
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Although less pronounced than previous analysis, this subset still demonstrates a 
statistically significant difference between the projects in the treatment and comparison groups. 
The estimated odds of commercialization success given that a project within this subset 
participated in the TAP is 2.4 times the estimated odds of those in the comparison group. 
Constructing a 95 percent confidence interval around this point estimate means the estimated 
probability of commercialization success for the treatment is at least 1.5 times to at most 3.8 times 
those of the comparison group.  
5.5. Multiple Project Firms Model: Potential Spillover Effects 
Thus far the analysis has demonstrated a consistent pattern of increased odds of success for 
Navy TAP participants compared to their counterparts. The potential exists within the dataset for 
potential spillover effects since many firms have projects across both the treated and comparison 
groups. Given my hypothesis that the Navy TAP has a positive impact on the probability of 
commercialization, if spillover effects exist, I would anticipate that the odds of success will be 
lessened for the subset of multiple project firms that split their project participation. To test this 
effect, I subset the data based on 71 firms, representing 328 projects, distributed across both the 
treatment and the comparison groups. The model results can be seen in Table 16. 
Table 16 Potential Spillover – Multiple Project Firms Split Participation in TAP and Comparison (n=328) 
Parameter Odds 
Ratio 
Standard Error 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Treatment (TAP versus Non-TAP) 2.159*** 0.2490 (1.330, 3.535) 
lnawardamount 2.088*** 0.2761 (1.232, 3.654) 
Nemploy (1 vs 5) 5.327** 0.6534 (1.480, 19.171) 
Nemploy (2 vs 5) 6.592*** 0.6765 (1.751, 24.822) 
Nemploy (3 vs 5) 4.847** 0.6436 (1.373, 17.112) 
Nemploy (4 vs 5) 3.231* 0.7035 (0.814, 12.828) 
Chi-Square Test Statistics (Alpha): *=.10; **= .05; ***= .01; **** = .0001. 
 
Based on the model results, the potential for spillover effects exists. While the Navy TAP 
participants maintain higher odds of success (2.16) compared to the comparison group, the odds 
are closer than any of the previous models explored. While the findings as they relate to spillovers 
48 
 
cannot be deemed definitive, the muted impact amongst these crossover firms can serve as a 
stepping stone for more in-depth exploration of the potential spillover.  
To understand the impact of the treatment across firm size and project award sizes, I 
calculated the estimated probability of success for a project with a median Phase II award amount 
($749,949) across the firm size brackets. The Navy TAP graduates held a higher predicted 
probability across the size brackets. The full results can be seen in Table 17. 
Table 17 Estimated Success Probabilities (Spillover) by Firm Size and Median Phase II Award ($749,949): TAP versus 
Non-TAP 
Estimated Success Probability 
Firm Size  TAP Non-TAP 
Nemploy (<25) 75% 58% 
Nemploy (25 to 49) 79% 63% 
Nemploy (50 to 149) 73% 56% 
Nemploy (150 to 249) 64% 45% 
Nemploy (250+) 36% 20% 
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis  
6.1. The Lower Bound 
Cross classification is also useful in measuring the lower bound of TAP impact. While 
developing the dataset I observed 127 projects that participated in the Navy Transition Assistance 
Program, but did not provide an update to the DoD Commercialization database following program 
conclusion. These projects were excluded from the final dataset. If one assumes that these projects 
did not provide an update because they were unsuccessful, then the impact of the treatment versus 
the comparison group would be overestimated. To protect against this scenario I assume that these 
projects were unsuccessful, and reanalyze the data. If the TAP projects still demonstrate higher 
odds of success, the resulting odds ratio can serve as a conservative lower bound estimate of the 
programmatic impact.  
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Table 18 Lower Bound 2x2 Contingency Table 
Project Commercialization (1-Commercialized, 0-Otherwise) 
Group 1 0 Percentage 
of Projects 
Navy TAP (Treatment) 59% 41% 59% 
Non-TAP (Comparison) 46% 54% 41% 
Total 54% 46%  
  
 Table 18 displays the updated cross classification which increased the number of 
unsuccessful treatment projects. The original dataset indicated a proportion of success of .73 for 
the treated firms, after updating the data to reflect this lower bound estimate, this proportion was 
reduced to .59. This updated figure still compares favorably to the comparison group which had a 
success proportion of .47. The updated difference in success proportions between the treatment 
and comparison groups is .12, with an estimated standard of error of .0302. Based on this 
information, I am 95 percent confident that the difference between the treatment and the 
comparison group is at least 6 percent and at most 18 percent higher. This means that at the lower 
bound, a significant difference still exists between the treatment and the comparison group, with 
the treatment maintaining a greater proportion of commercialization success.  
 It is clear that the magnitude of impact between the treatment and the comparison group is 
less pronounced. In the original dataset the treatment group had a 3 to 1 probability of success 
compared to the comparison group. Under the lower-bound scenario, the odds drop to a point 
estimate of 1.64 times the odds of the comparison group. Constructing a 95 percent confidence 
interval under this scenario shows the odds estimate ranges from 1.29 to 2.08. So under the more 
conservative evaluation of programmatic impact, I can be 95 percent confident that the probability 
of commercialization success is at least 29 percent higher, and at most double, the odds of success 
for the comparison group.  
7. Summary of Results 
7.1. Probability of Commercialization Success 
Commercialization (private sector or Non-SBIR funding) of federally sponsored 
innovations is a key congressionally mandated goal of the Small Business Innovation Research 
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(SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. While much attention has 
focused on quantifying and assessing the commercial outputs of the SBIR program, limited 
research exists on the impact business advisory support initiatives have on project 
commercialization. These programs, such as the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program (TAP), 
seek to augment the business capacity of SBIR/STTR award recipients by providing information 
and resources focused on facilitating the commercialization process. I employed a logistic 
regression model to examine commercialization outcomes from participants and non-participants 
in the Navy's Transition Assistance Program (TAP). A dataset comprised of 993 Navy Phase II 
projects awarded between 2005 and 2008 was used to populate the model. The self-reported 
commercialization outcomes contained in the dataset include 537 Navy TAP projects, and a 
comparison group of 456 Navy Phase II projects who opted not to participate in the program during 
the years covered. The resulting analysis found that the odds of success given that a project 
participated in the Navy TAP ranged from 1.5 to 6.2 times the odds of success for a non-
participating project, depending upon firm characteristics (a summary of results can be seen in 
Table 19).  
Based on the 95 percent confidence intervals from the respective models, the odds of 
success given that a project participated in the Navy TAP range from a high of 6.2 to a low of 1.5, 
depending upon firm characteristics. The full model which uses the entire 993 projects without 
any subsets indicates that the odds of success for TAP projects are 2.3 to 4 times the odds of 
success for non-participating firms. For the subset of single-winning firms, the model indicates 
that the estimated odds for success are 3.03 times the odds of success for a project in the 
comparison group. Stated differently, the model results indicate that for a Navy Phase II project 
with less than 25 employees, and a median sized Phase II ($749,949) the estimated probability of 
success would be 65 percent, if they participated in the Navy TAP. If a project with the same 
characteristics chose not to participate in the Navy TAP, its success probability will fall to 38 
percent. Amongst the subset of projects who were either entirely exposed to the treatment, or fully 
opted out of the program, the odds of success for those exposed to the Navy TAP are at least double 
the projects in the comparison group.  
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Table 19 Summary of Model Results: TAP versus Non-TAP 
Model Results: TAP versus Non-TAP Commercialization Success Estimates 
Model Description Odds Ratio 
(TAP as Single 
Predictor) 
95 % 
Confidence 
Interval 
Logistic Model Specification/ TAP Odds 
Ratio/Probability of Success 
Full Model (n=933) 3.05 (2.3 to 4.0) 	 = 1 = −10.7095 + 1.0127 +
.6891  + 1.3190"#$  <
25  
Odds Ratio  = 2.75 
Probability of Success TAP is 72%; Non-TAP is 
48%  
(at median award size ($749,949), and less than 25 
employees) 
Single Project Firms 
(n=379) 
3.3 (2.2 to 5.0) 	 = 1 = −9.2193 + 1.1070 +
.6463   
Odds Ratio  = 3.03 
Probability of Success TAP is 65%; Non-TAP is 
38%  
(at median award size ($749,949)) 
Multiple Projects 
Firms: TAP-Only vs. 
NON-TAP Only 
(n=286) 
3.7 (2.1 to 6.2) 	 = 1 = −8.6350 + 1.2757 +
.6267   
Odds Ratio  = 3.58 
Probability of Success TAP is 75%; Non-TAP is 
46%  
(at median award size ($749,949)) 
Multiple Project Firms: 
Projects Split across 
Treatment/Comparison 
(Potential Spillover, 
n=328)  
2.4 (1.5 to 3.8) 	 = 1 = −11.3173 + .7694 +
.7363  + 1.6728"#$  <
25  
Odds Ratio  = 2.16 
Probability of Success TAP is 75%; Non-TAP is 
58%  
(at median award size ($749,949), and less than 25 
employees) 
Sensitivity Analysis: 
The Lower Bound 
(n=1120) 
1.64 (1.29 to 
2.08) 
 
 
The 993 projects in the dataset was represented by 557 unique firms, meaning a subset of 
firms had multiple projects during the years covered. Specifically, 178 firms accounted for 62 
percent of the projects within the dataset. These multiple award winners have close to a 12 
percentage point difference in the proportion of successful firms compared to single project firms 
overall. It is also evident that less than 5 percent of the unique companies (23 companies winning 
6+ projects) account for nearly a third (32 percent) of all reported commercialization funding. This 
finding is not unique, it is consistent with previous findings on multiple award winners and 
commercialization outcomes. The National Research Council found that 60 percent of SBIR 
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commercialization resulted from the 7 percent of firms winning the most awards (National 
Research Council, 2008, p. 156). The prevalence of concentrated success amongst a small subset 
of repeat winners is characteristic of the SBIR and STTR programs, and not specific to this dataset 
or the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP). 
I ran two models focusing on these multiple project firms. The first model was populated 
by multiple project firms entering either all of their projects, or none of their projects, in the Navy 
TAP. This subset featured the highest model based odds ratio, indicating that projects exposed to 
the TAP are 3.6 times more likely to be successful than their counterparts. These models (single 
project firms, and TAP-Only versus Non-TAP multiple project firms) do not have to deal with 
potential spillover effects because there are no firm overlaps between the treatment and 
comparison groups. Without concerns of spillover, the odds of success given that a project 
participated in the TAP is estimated to be at least 3 times the odds of success of a project that did 
not participate in the program, and at least double based on the lower bound of the 95 percent 
confidence interval.  
My analysis has demonstrated a consistent pattern of increased odds of success for Navy 
TAP participants compared to their counterparts. The potential exists within the dataset for 
spillover effects since multiple firms have projects across both the treated and comparison groups. 
Since I hypothesize that the TAP has a positive impact on the probability of commercialization, if 
spillover effects exist, I would anticipate that the odds of success will be lessened for firms with 
projects distributed across the treatment and comparison groups. To test this effect, I subset the 
data set based on 71 firms, representing 328 projects, distributed across both the treatment and the 
comparison groups. Based on the model results, the potential for spillover effects exists. While the 
Navy TAP participants maintain higher odds of success (2.16) compared to the comparison group, 
the odds of the success are closer than any of the previous models explored. While the findings as 
they relate to spillovers cannot be deemed definitive, the muted impact amongst these crossover 
firms can serve as a stepping stone for more in-depth exploration of the potential spillover.  
7.2. Cost Benefit and Cost Effectiveness 
The Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP) represents a cost effective way for both 
increasing the magnitude of commercialization success and probability of commercialization 
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success (the number of successes). As described earlier in Table 4, on average Navy TAP projects 
reported close to $500,000 more in commercialization than their non-participating counterparts. A 
streamlined cost-benefit analysis, using the agency per project TAP expenditures as the primary 
cost, and the marginal difference between TAP and Non-TAP commercialization outcomes, I 
found a cost benefit ratio of 37.9. As seen in Table 20, the 537 projects that participated in the 
Navy TAP exceeded the non-TAP projects total commercialization by a present value of $292.3 
million, representing a net present value of $284.5 million. The Navy investment in the Transition 
Assistance Program (TAP) has generated approximately $38 in commercialization outcomes, per 
dollar invested, and has a net benefit of $284.5 million. 
Table 20 Navy TAP Cost Benefit Analysis 
Cost Benefit Analysis 
Costs (Present Value (PV) at r = 3%) 
Portfolio Participation Costs (PV)  $7,719,433 
Benefits (PV at r = 3%) 
Cumulative Difference in Commercialization10 $292,250,682 
Net Present Value (NPV) $284,531,249 
Benefit-Cost Ratio 37.9 
 
The Navy TAP also increases the probability of success, or stated differently, generates 
more successes than one would expect absent the program. As seen in the descriptive statistics of 
the dataset (described earlier in Table 4) using non-participant outcomes as the status quo, one 
would expect 46 successes per 100 SBIR Phase II awards in the absence of the Transition 
Assistance Program. Given the results of TAP participants, I would expect twenty-seven (27) 
additional successes (or 73 successes per 100 participating projects). This marginal increase 
represents a cost to the agency, simplified for these purposes, as the per project participation cost 
of approximately $15,000 per project (National Research Council, 2007). As seen in Table 21, 
                                                 
10
 I utilized a 3 percent social discount rate and assumed a delay between agency investment and 
commercialization outcomes. I anticipated commercialization occurring in year 4 (60% of expected 
commercialization) and year 5 (40% of commercialization). 
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based on these per project costs and anticipated outcomes, the cost to generate an additional 
successful project is $55,556.  
Table 21 TAP Cost Effectiveness Analysis per Additional Success 
Cost Effectiveness Analysis 
Successes per 100 Non-TAP projects 46 
Successes per 100 TAP projects 73 
Marginal increase in successful projects given TAP 27 
Total cost per 100 TAP projects ($15K x 100) $1,500,000 
Total cost per additional success $55,556 
Average TAP Commercialization (r = 3%) $1,318,423 
Net Present Value (r = 3%) $1,262,868 
Present Value Benefit-Cost Ratio 23.73 
 
This cost effectiveness ratio of $55,600 per additional success is offset by the expected 
increase in commercialization. Simplifying the anticipated outcome as the known (present value) 
average commercialization of a Navy TAP project, I anticipate each additional success beyond the 
status quo, would generate $1.32 million in commercialization. The net present value per 
additional success is $1.26 million, and the present value benefit cost ratio is approximately 24. 
So utilizing the Navy TAP as a policy tool to increase the number of successful projects will cost 
federal agencies $55,600 per additional success; however, they can expect a return of 
approximately $24 per dollar invested.   
 Cost effectiveness analysis is a useful tool for federal policy makers when deciding how 
best to allocate the tax payer resources. The Navy investments in the TAP has had an overall cost-
benefit ratio of 37.9, indicating an effective use of resources as measured by the increased 
generation of commercialization. It also appears, that the program is an effectiveness investment 
in not only maximizing the magnitude of commercialization dollars relative to the status-quo (non-
TAP outcomes), but also in creating successes that otherwise would not have occurred. It costs the 
Navy, through the TAP, close to $56,000 to generate a success that otherwise would not have 
occurred. This per success investment is easily offset, as it is anticipated that those additional 
successes will generate $1.3 million in commercialization, for a cost-benefit return of $24 per 
dollar invested.  
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8. Areas for Additional Research 
This project focused specifically on the odds of success given that a project participated in 
the Navy Transition Assistance Program (TAP). Award recipients from acquisition agencies have 
the dual opportunity of commercializing their federal research within markets internal to the 
government, as well as commercially. It is unclear if the effectiveness demonstrated by the TAP 
is also found in non-acquisition agencies. This unknown represents an area for additional 
exploration.   
In addition, examination of the firm decision making process, including their pre-entry 
characteristics, could provide more insight into who and why certain firms request support while 
others do not. Lastly, a broader exploration based on commercialization assistance program 
investments and programmatic outcomes could shed light into the level of funding necessary to 
impact a project’s commercialization outcomes.  
9. Policy Implications  
9.1. Exogenous Business Support Can Enhance Success Probability 
This research demonstrates that exogenous support, like the Navy’s TAP, can enhance 
projects probability of commercialization success. My analysis found that the odds of 
commercialization success are at least twice as likely for a project participating in the Transition 
Assistance Program, compared to non-participating projects. This finding has many policy 
implications, chief among them, is my belief that federal agency program managers should 
strongly consider establishing commercialization assistance programs. 
In establishing the SBIR/STTR programs, Congress sought to harness the innovative 
capability of small businesses to both diversify the federal research and development service 
marketplace and generate societal benefits. Maximizing the economic outcomes from federal 
SBIR/STTR investments occurs as firms commercialize (either in commercial markets or through 
the federal acquisition process) products and services which generate jobs, support advanced 
weapon systems, or drive down federal research and development costs through increased 
competition. While the small firms attracted to the SBIR/STTR program may be technically 
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advanced, they may lack the necessary business capacity to create these down-stream societal 
benefits.  
Storey (2003) found that small and medium firms tend to underinvest in the services which 
could augment their business capacity because they are unclear or underestimate the long-term 
benefits of those investments. The Navy, through the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), has 
sought to address this information failure, and to maximize the societal benefits from federal 
research and development funding in a cost effective manner. 
The Navy investments in the TAP has had an overall cost-benefit ratio of 37.9, indicating 
an effective use of resources as measured by the increased generation of commercialization. It also 
appears, that the program is an effective investment in not only maximizing the magnitude of 
commercialization dollars relative to the status-quo (non-TAP outcomes), but also in creating 
successes that otherwise would not occur. Given the existence of the Navy TAP, we can anticipate 
27 additional successes per hundred Phase II projects.  
Establishing commercialization assistance programs will not only allow federal agencies 
to overcome this knowledge gap and generate increased commercialization both measured in 
magnitude and probability, but also provide an alternative to penalizing unsuccessful firms, and 
balance the sometimes competing goals of stimulating innovation and maximizing economic 
outcomes.  
9.1.2. Alternative to Penalizing Firms 
Commercialization assistance programs can also be viewed as an alternative to penalties 
for failure to meet commercialization performance benchmarks. As discussed previously, these 
benchmarks were established to ensure firms make every effort to commercialize their 
SBIR/STTR projects. While this approach implies a failure of the firm, it is possible that the failure 
may be insufficient knowledge to transition from technologist to successful entrepreneurs. As a 
policy tool, commercialization assistance programs can be extended to these firms prior to any 
award penalties. This will ensure that their failure is firm, or technology, based, and not a reflection 
of a knowledge gap.  
9.1.3. Commercialization Assistance Programs Balance Dual Programmatic Goals 
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The SBIR program started as an initiative to leverage the innovative capacity of small 
businesses and use them in meeting federal research and development needs. Although increasing 
the private sector commercialization of federal research and development innovations was among 
the goals, it was not viewed as more important relative to other goals. However, with the increased 
emphasis on commercialization, I fear program managers of federal research and development 
programs may become more conservative in their award process, which could stymie technological 
innovation.  
When the program was conceptualized by Roland Tibbetts, a key feature was the ability to 
test as many innovative ideas as possible. Implicit in this is an acceptance of technology failure 
which is inevitable when pursuing cutting edge innovations. While project commercialization 
potential is a component of the proposal evaluation process, I believe, through the implementation 
of commercialization assistance programs, agencies can balance their interest in funding the most 
technologically promising projects, while also pursuing economic outcomes from the federal 
research investments. Commercialization assistance programs are established and organized to 
augment the business capacity of participating firms, so award decisions can be tilted towards the 
most innovative technology pursuits while the firm specific business risks can be mitigated through 
exogenous assistance programs.  
9.2. Broader Consideration of Programmatic Outcome Metrics 
Prior research has often sought to draw a direct line between a given SBIR/STTR award 
and commercialization outcomes. This approach fails to capture a demonstrated outcome form 
social capital networks--the development of new opportunities between partnering firms 
(Fountain, 1999). Social Capital (Fountain, 1999) is the process of establishing inter-
organizational linkages based on trust, collaboration, and networks. Innovation is enabled through 
this collaborative effort. I believe the social capital enabling component of the Navy TAP 
contributes to commercialization success.  
In many ways the Navy TAP serves as the hub for facilitating trust amongst the various 
acquisition actors. While the majority of activity is focused on the individual small firm, a key 
aspect of all interactions is enhancing their capacity to partner and leverage information and 
opportunities from others stakeholders. While some firms may go it alone, the majority will often 
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work with a large system integrator to ultimately transition their technology to the warfighter. The 
Navy TAP recognizes this pathway, and works to identify and facilitate connections with points 
of contact in the major defense primes and other arms of the acquisition community. While social 
capital as it relates to enabling innovation has typically focused on regional synergies and 
relationships, the Navy TAP, through its Navy Opportunity Forum, attempts to overcome these 
geographical boundaries by bringing together members of these communities for the opportunity 
to network and develop new, or more involved, relationships. 
The role the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program (TAP), and its contractor, 
Dawnbreaker, play in enabling these new networks and relationships has clear policy implications. 
A demonstrated outcome form social capital networks are the development of new opportunities 
between partnering firms (Fountain, 1999). Unfortunately, the growth of these new connections 
and possibly new lines of research and development may not be captured under current outcome 
metrics applied to the SBIR/STTR programs. Prior research has focused on commercialization 
outcomes related to the underlying SBIR/STTR projects. Enhancing the “social capital” of 
SBIR/STTR firms can result in new partnerships that lead to the development of novel lines of 
research. In lieu of this, broader outcome metrics should be used in evaluating the success of the 
SBIR/STTR programs, specifically as it relates to firms involved in initiatives, like the Navy TAP, 
which facilitate innovation based social capital. 
9.3. Commercialization Assistance Funding Should be Increased 
Current legislation allows a firm to either expend, or receive on its behalf, external 
commercialization support amounting to approximately 1 percent of the typical Phase II award 
amount. This figure should be reexamined to ensure the resources provided are sufficient to enable 
the firm to overcome their knowledge gap, facilitate the development of social capital, and to 
navigate the challenging federal acquisition communities. Congress has demonstrated a 
continuous and growing emphasis on the commercialization outcomes of Federal SBIR/STTR 
research investments. While their emphasis is clear, per project commercialization investments are 
minor. Federal agencies and commercialization assistance providers should work to identify the 
minimum level of expenditures for commercialization support and make those amounts allowable 
expenditures from the SBIR and STTR set-asides.  
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Instituting the expansion of commercialization assistance programs will be a challenge 
because not all firms, or policy actors, believe the expenditures are warranted. Given the current 
federal budgetary landscape, any expansion will most likely be funded through the SBIR and 
STTR extramural set-asides. This inevitably places a challenge upon SBIR and STTR program 
managers, as it will either reduce the number of Phase I or Phase II awards, or decrease the award 
amounts. Either decision may be meet with reluctance both in Congress, and from SBIR/STTR 
firm advocacy groups. While Congress has shown an interest in the economic outcomes, it has 
also sought to diversify the geographic dispersion of SBIR and STTR awards, and may view a 
reduction in awards as an affront to their outreach goals. Also, established winners of SBIR Phase 
I and Phase II awards, specifically repeat winners, may not feel commercialization support is 
sufficiently needed to reduce the number of awards, or decrease individual project awards.  
Despite these challenges, based on the anecdotal reports, and as this research has 
demonstrated, the Navy TAP is a cost-effective mechanism to both increase the magnitude of 
commercialization dollars and the probability of commercialization success. I believe the Navy 
TAP has demonstrated investments in commercialization assistance programs represent a cost 
effective way to maximize programmatic outcomes and increase the probability of programmatic 
success.  
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